A classroom experiment in monetary policy

The authors propose a classroom experiment implementing a simple version of a New Keynesian model suitable for courses in intermediate macroeconomics and money and banking. Students play as either the central bank or members of the private sector. The central banker sets interest rates to meet twin objectives for inflation and the output gap or to meet only an inflation target. In both settings, private sector agents are concerned with correctly forecasting the inflation rate. The authors show that an experiment implementing this setup is feasible and yields results that enhance understanding of the New Keynesian model of monetary policy. They propose alternative versions where the central bank is replaced by a policy rule and provide suggestions for discussing the experimental results with students.     

How justified is abandoning money in the conduct of monetary policy in Australia on the grounds of instability in the money‐demand function?

The role of money in the design and conduct of monetary policy has reemerged as an important issue in both advanced and developing economies, especially since the 2007 global financial crisis. A growing body of recent literature suggests that the causal relationship between money supply growth and inflation remains intact across countries and over time and that this relation is not conditional on the stability of the money‐demand function or whether money is endogenous or exogenous. Moreover, critical for a rule‐based monetary policy is the presence of a long‐run stable money‐demand function, rather than a short‐run money‐demand model that may exhibit instability for many reasons, including problems with estimating a money‐demand model with high‐frequency data. Provided that a stable money‐demand function exists, it could be useful to establish long‐run equilibrium relations among money, output, prices, and exchange rates, as the classical monetary theory suggests. Within this analytical framework, this paper addresses the question of whether money has any role in the conduct of monetary policy in Australia. The conventional wisdom is that the money‐demand function in Australia has been unstable since the mid‐1980s due to financial deregulation and reforms; this led to a change in the strategy of monetary policy for price stability in the form of inflation targeting that ignores money insofar as inflation and its control are concerned. This paper reports empirical findings for Australia, obtained from a longer quarterly data series over the period 1960Q1–2015Q1, which suggest that instability in the narrow‐money‐demand function in Australia was primarily due to the exclusion of variables which have become important in the deregulated environment since the 1980s. These findings are confirmed by an expanded form of the narrow‐money‐demand function that was found stable over the past two decades, although it experienced multiple structural breaks over the study period. The paper draws the conclusion that abandoning the monetary aggregate as an instrument of monetary policy in Australia, under a rule‐based monetary policy such as inflation targeting, cannot be justified by instability in the money‐demand function or even by lack of a causal link between money supply growth and inflation.     

Fiscal rules to tame the political budget cycle: Evidence from Italian municipalities

The paper provides evidence that fiscal rules can limit the political budget cycle. It uses data on Italian municipalities during the 2000s and shows that: 1) municipalities are subject to political budget cycles in capital spending; 2) the Italian sub-national fiscal rule (Domestic Stability Pact, DSP) introduced in 1999 has been enforced by the central government; 3) municipalities subject to the fiscal rule show more limited political budget cycles than municipalities not subject to the rule. In order to identify the effect, we rely on the fact that the domestic fiscal rule does not apply to municipalities below 5000 inhabitants. We find that the political budget cycle increases real capital spending by about 10–20 percent on average in the years prior to municipal elections and that municipalities subject to the DSP show a pre-electoral increase in capital spending which is only a quarter of the one of municipalities not subject to the rule.     

The German labor market during the Great Recession: Shocks and institutions

This paper analyzes Germany's unusual labor market experience during the Great Recession. We estimate a general equilibrium model with a detailed labor market block for post-unification Germany. This allows us to disentangle the role of institutions (short-time work, government spending rules) and shocks (aggregate, labor market, and policy shocks) and to perform counterfactual exercises. We identify positive labor market performance shocks (likely caused by labor market reforms) as the key driver for the “German labor market miracle” during the Great Recession.     

Supply‐ versus Demand‐Side Policies in the Presence of Carbon Leakage and the Green Paradox

We consider a climate coalition that seeks to reduce global emissions in the presence of carbon leakage and resource exhaustibility. We show that a credible announcement of future unilateral supply‐side policies delays foreign emissions, and we derive the optimal combination of consumer taxes and producer taxes when we consider leakages from free riders, both within periods and across periods. The tax shares generally differ over time. A decline in the present value of the social cost of carbon over time supports a time path where the consumers’ tax share of the total carbon tax also declines over time. We illustrate our findings with a numerical model.     

通胀目标制与汇率目标制不能共存吗

基于汇率传递的风险溢价渠道，本文将我国利率调控通胀、外汇储备对冲干预汇率纳入新凯恩斯政策模型，构建双目标双工具政策分析框架，比较泰勒规则与双目标双工具规则下通胀目标与汇率目标共存的经济机制与效应。本文模拟显示：（1）双目标双工具政策框架下通胀目标与汇率目标能够共存，此时通过影响汇率风险溢价来盯住汇率不影响通胀；而单工具政策下两目标无法共存，此时降低国内资产的收益率盯住汇率会刺激居民的消费行为引起通胀。（2）国际资本冲击下，双目标双工具政策在固定汇率的同时能保证经济稳定；而当贸易条件恶化时，选择完全浮动汇率制度最优。央行政策损失分析进一步验证了以上结论。（3）随着金融市场化改革深入，外汇储备稳定汇率的有效性将下降，冲销成本会大幅提升。资本账户开放下，双目标双工具政策仍是央行抵御外部资本冲击的首选政策；但是汇率市场化后，通胀目标制与双目标双工具政策效果基本无差异。本文结论的启示是：面对国际资本，需必要的汇率管制；但是面对贸易冲击，可适度提升汇率弹性来减少冲击对产出和通胀的影响。     

Use and misuse of information in supply chain forecasting of promotion effects

Demand forecasting is critical to sales and operations planning (S&OP), but the effects of sales promotions can be difficult to forecast. Typically, a baseline statistical forecast is judgmentally adjusted on receipt of information from different departments. However, much of this information either has no predictive value or its value is unknown. Research into base rate discounting has suggested that such information may distract forecasters from the average uplift and reduce accuracy. This has been investigated in situations in which forecasters were able to adjust the statistical forecasts for promotions via a forecasting support system (FSS). In two ecologically valid experiments, forecasters were provided with the mean level of promotion uplift, a baseline statistical forecast, and quantitative and qualitative information. However, the forecasters were distracted from the base rate and misinterpreted the information available to them. These findings have important implications for the design of organizational S&OP processes, and for the implementation of FSSs.     

众创空间集聚的连续距离测度及影响因素分析

基于253家浙江省众创空间的微观数据，文章在运用连续距离的测度方法测算众创空间集聚水平的基础上，采用零膨胀负二项回归等方法实证分析众创空间集聚的影响机制。研究发现，众创空间的地理分布存在显著的区域差异，主要分布在杭州和宁波市辖区，选址具有明显的集聚特征。回归结果显示，区域创新能力和生态环境均对众创空间的地理集聚具有促进作用，但两者之间存在明显的替代效应；尽管不能直接促进众创空间的集聚，政策引导与创新能力之间具有较显著的互补效应。据此，文章从培育创新能力和优化创新激励等方面提出了政策建议。     

Does Targeted Monetary Policy Matter? A Perspective from China

Several major central banks have experimented with targeted monetary policy to improve credit resource allocation. This policy only applies to ‘eligible’ banks. For example, The People's Bank of China conducted seven targeted reductions of reserve requirements during 2014–15. This article documents the phenomenon of targeted monetary policy and evaluates its effects. The results show that, in the case of China, this policy has generated an extra significant, positive return on the stocks of eligible banks, amounting to 1.2–1.3 per cent in a four‐day treatment period. This substantial return gives commercial banks an extra incentive to align with the policy goals of central banks.